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A New Medical Malpractice Tort System:
It’s Time to Prioritize The Patient

J

Jaden Cowdin1 and Tyler Lindley2

ust over three years ago, the author married his beautiful wife
Lindsay. Unfortunately, disaster struck a few months after their
wedding. Lindsay fell incredibly ill and was hospitalized. Her
condition worsened to the point that the author feared she would
never recover. To make matters worse, Lindsey was left in the
care of a seemingly negligent doctor. Without performing any of
the standard tests, he diagnosed her with a condition called SMA
syndrome. The diagnosis required a nasal feeding tube—which
goes past the stomach deep into the intestines—to be inserted.
Both the procedure to insert the tube and its maintenance were
unpleasant. This doctor unsuccessfully treated Lindsay for four
months before they obtained a second opinion. Upon receiving
a second opinion, the new doctor performed the obvious test and
1
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immediately gave Lindsay a different diagnosis. The feeding tube
was subsequently removed, but those four months of mistreatment
have caused issues with which Lindsay still struggles today.
The author’s frustrations with the offending doctor caused
him to research possible legal action. After researching the topic,
he realized that his desire to sue this practitioner was misguided.
Although malpractice lawsuits may help the victimized patient,
they exacerbate problems, such as increased health care costs and
the increased practice of defensive medicine.3 How can we properly
compensate victimized patients while minimizing the negative effect
of malpractice suits on health care costs and defensive medicine?
Current attempts at tort reform are aimed at capping rewards
for non-economic damages and contingency fees in malpractice
cases.4 These attempts have proved ineffective and have been met
with negative treatment by patients and patient-advocacy groups.5
Despite the prevalence of unsuccessful attempts, we propose that
such a resolution does exist and has already been proposed by
state legislatures. This resolution includes a replacement of the
current tort system in favor of a malpractice review board, together
with a demerit system that reports negligent physicians without
additional financial strain. This review board and demerit system
would effectually replace litigation within medical malpractice.
Adopting this solution will slow down increasing insurance
premiums and decrease the prevalence of defensive medicine,
3

4

5

Daniel Kessler and Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive
Medicine? 111 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 353 (1996)
(presenting evidence that defensive medicine is prevalent and can be
reduced to a degree from tort reform). See also M. Sonal Sekhar and N.
Vyas, Defensive Medicine: A Bane to Healthcare, 3(2) Ann. Med. Health
Sci. Res. 295 (2013) (discussing defensive medicine and its effect on
healthcare prices generally).
Richard E. Anderson, M.D., Case Study: Effective Legal Reform and the
Malpractice Insurance Crisis. 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y l. & ethics 341
(2005) (summarizing many of the popular reform among states).
Valerie Witmer, Third Annual Health Law Colloquium: A Patient
Perspective: Focusing on Compensating Harm. 13 Ann. Health L. 589
(2004).
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while still providing the benefits of the current tort system.
In this paper, we will explore this proposal in greater detail
and explain why it would be effective and realistic. In section I, we
will give background information regarding the current malpractice
tort system and its history. Section II gives an in-depth analysis on the
current problems within the system and futile attempts at its reform.
Following this analysis, Section III details our proposed replacement
and demonstrates its support and practical nature. A few states have
already begun to debate similar ideas in their legislatures; each will be
evaluated in detail. Section IV will conclude the paper and contains
a call to action for all members of state legislatures to examine the
current malpractice climate in their respective states and propose
and vote for bills aligned with the proposals presented in this paper.
I. A Glance at the Current Malpractice Tort System

Malpractice law falls under tort—or personal-injury—
law. An effective medical malpractice law and its accompanying
tort system is supposed provide relief to victims of malpractice,
deter negligent behavior by physicians, and improve the overall
quality of health care delivery.6 To succeed in a medical lawsuit,
the plaintiff must satisfy the following established criteria:
1) The plaintiff must show that the defendant owed a duty
of care to the plaintiff.
2) The plaintiff must prove that the defendant breached
this duty of care.
3) The plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant
breached this duty by failing to adhere to the standard
of care expected.
4) The plaintiff must show that this breach of duty caused
injury to the plaintiff.7
6

David Studdert, Michelle Mello, Troyen A. Brennan, Medical malpractice. 23 The New Eng. J. of Med: 283. (2004).

7

Id.
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The standard of care referred to is defined by the state where the
alleged incident occurred. The attorney for the plaintiff serves
as the system’s gatekeeper because claims rarely move forward
without counsel.8 Once an attorney determines that the patient
has a case against a physician, the attorney becomes the pivotal
players in determining the amount to be awarded for damages.9
In theory, the malpractice system functions as follows:
the courts serve as a general deterrence and provide a method of
reparation in cases where self-regulation of physicians has failed to
provide the adequate standard of care.10 Plaintiffs’ attorneys facilitate
this process by separating valid claims from illegitimate ones, and
liability insurance for physicians protects health care providers
from bankruptcy.11 However, the current application of the system
is more complicated and less efficient.12 Unnecessary spending is
prevalent as doctors practice defensive medicine, by ordering tests
and procedures out of fear of getting sued, rather than concern for
the patient.13 The patient pays the additional costs from these tests
and procedures; furthermore, physicians face increased malpractice
insurance premiums which are passed onto the consumer.14
Numerous attempts at reform have occurred on the state and
national levels to return to a simpler, more efficient system. In 2000,
the Bush administration proposed a national $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice awards.15 At the state level,
8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Kessler, supra footnote 3.

14

15

Adriaan Ten Kate and Gunnar Niels, To What Extent are Cost Saving
Passed on to Consumers? And Oligopoly Approach 20 European J. of L.
and Econ. 323, (2005) (a brief discussion on how costs are passed on
to consumers regardless of the assumed market structure).
Michelle Diaz, The Real Emergency: Will Florida Follow Georgia in
Medical Malpractice Reform, 40 Nova L. Rev. 185 (2015).
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Georgia has changed the standard of evidence for proving malpractice
from a preponderance of the evidence to a higher and more convincing
standard of proof, but “only when a practitioner has shown a standard
of gross negligence.”16 States like Utah, Arizona, and North Carolina
have followed Georgia, but exclude “only when a practitioner has
shown a standard of gross negligence.”17 Other states, like Florida,
have attempted to institute caps on non-economic damages that
vary based on the specialty of the provider being sued.18 These
reforms seek to mitigate the rising costs of liability insurance—and,
therefore, health insurance premiums—and limit defensive medicine.
II. Issues Caused by The Current Malpractice Tort System

A. Health Insurance Premiums on the Rise

The average annual cost of health insurance premiums for
employer-sponsored family coverage reached $16,029 in 2013.19 This
is a 73 percent increase from the average cost in 2003 of $9,249.20
During that same time period, premiums for single coverage also
increased from $3,481 to $5,571 per year, a 60 percent increase.21
Additionally, insurance premium increases outpaced income growth
during this period: while the average family premiums have risen
73 percent, median family income has risen merely 16 percent over
the same period.22 In 2013, annual family premiums constituted 23
percent of the median family’s income, up from 15 percent in 2003 and
16

Id.

17

Id.

18

David Studdert, Michelle Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Medical Malpractice. 23 The New Eng. J. of Med. 283 (2004).

19

Sara R. Collins, David C. Radley, Cathy Schoen &, Sophie Beutel, 32 National Trends in the Cost of Employer Health Insurance Coverage, 20032013. Issue Brief. New York, NY: The Commonwealth Fund (2014).

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id.
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21 percent in 2010.23 Apart from premiums, deductibles have more
than doubled from 2003 to 2013, up from an average of $1,575 to
$3,761 annually for family plans.24 This data reveals stark increases in
health insurance costs without a corresponding increase in coverage.
Unfortunately, medical malpractice plays a role in this increase.
Medical malpractice represents a respectable portion of all
health care expenditures. The medical malpractice system costs the
country approximately $55.6 billion a year according to a study by
the Harvard School of Public Health.25 Given this large amount and
the fact that the vast majority of malpractice payouts are paid by
physicians themselves, some have suggested it directly affects the
patient’s health care costs. An article from the American Journal of
Medical Research discusses the idea that the prevailing growth in
malpractice premiums contributes to the growth in health care costs.26
The connection between medical malpractice and health
insurance premiums is supported by economic theory.27 When
malpractice insurance premiums increase from the number of lawsuits
and payouts, state regulations, or other factors, doctors are left to
23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Michelle M. Mello, Amitabh Chandra, Atul A. Gawande and David M.
Studdert, National Costs of the Medical Liability System 29(9) Health
Aff. (Millwood) 1569 (2010).

26

Gheorghe H. Popescu, Increased Medical Malpractice Expenditures as
a Main Determinant of Growth in Health Care Spending, 2(1) Am. J.
Med. Res. 80-86 (2015) (“The expansion of medical malpractice liability expenditures may impact the distribution of health care in the U.S.
The predicted payouts experienced by insurers tend to have a first-order
consequence on malpractice premiums. Rises in malpractice premiums
increase the expenditures of doing business for physicians and hospitals…
The medical malpractice procedure is a time-consuming and costly approach for recompensing individuals who are injured as a consequence of
(not) receiving treatment. The increased expenses of medical malpractice
insurance premiums are a sign that the medical malpractice system is
imperfect. Medical malpractice is an element of second-order significance
among drivers of rises in health care expenditure and of reductions in
patient access to care.”).

27

Kate, supra footnote 14.
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absorb the higher costs. As a result, many of these costs are passed
on to consumers as physicians charge more for medical services and
health insurance companies are forced to cover the additional charges.
In turn, health insurance companies raise premiums and deductibles
to balance the increased cost of providing coverage. Patients, largely
unaware of the effects, continue to move forward with lawsuits—
both frivolous and non-frivolous—relying on a settlement paid for
by malpractice insurance and not considering the consequences of
such actions. This cycle continues due to a lack of an immediate
individual incentive to stop—a modern-day prisoner’s dilemma.28
B. Medical Malpractice as a Cause of Defensive Medicine
By definition, defensive medicine is the performance of
unnecessary procedures due to fear of malpractice suits.29 When a
doctor orders too many tests or prescribes treatment out of fear of
being sued for failing to meet the perceived standard of care, regard
for the patient decreases and the market becomes inefficient. Of
the $55.6 billion spent on medical malpractice in 2008, defensive
medicine cost $45.6 billion; roughly 80 percent of all malpractice
spending. Defensive medicine creates unnecessary expenses for
the consumer receiving medical care. We understand the doctor’s
situation; however, a doctor should not be performing medical
tests out of fear of lawsuit rather than a regard for the patient.
Senator Orrin Hatch said the following in a prominent medical
journal regarding his discussions with physicians about defensive
medicine: Hatch said the following in a prominent medical journal
regarding his discussions with physicians about defensive medicine:

28
29

The constant threat of litigation leads physicians to perform extraneous and often inappropriate procedures,
the costs of which they have no choice but to pass on to

William Poundstone, Prisoner’s Dilemma: John Von Neumann, Game
Theory and the Puzzle of the Bomb. (Reprint Ed., 1993).
Sekhar, supra footnote 3.
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their patients. To stay in business, physicians must do
everything they can to avoid being sued and to keep the
costs of their malpractice insurance premiums from going through the roof.30

Since over 90 percent of Americans are covered by some
form of health insurance, these cost shifts are seen in
increased
health
insurance
premiums,
adding
further
evidence to earlier discussion about the connection between
medical malpractice and health insurance premiums.31
C. Attempts at Tort Reform
Caps on non-economic damages are popular among current
proponents of reform, but this attempt at reform is inherently flawed.
The scarcity of high-stakes malpractice cases affected by such caps
minimizes any effect this policy might have.32 Caps on non-economic
damages also do not fully address rising costs of medical malpractice
insurance or defensive medicine. If doctors are still being sued at a high
rate, malpractice insurance will continue to rise and defensive medicine
will remain prevalent in physicians’ typical practice. Other opponents
to damage caps claim that this effort to improve efficiency unfairly
burdens victims of true malpractice.33 In fact, the constitutionality
30

Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Invited Commentary—It Is Time to Address the Costs
of Defensive Medicine: Comment on “Physicians’ Views on Defensive
Medicine: A National Survey,” 170(12) Arch. Intern. Med. 1081 (2010)
doi:10.1001/archinternmed.2010.155.1.

31

Health Insurance Coverage, Center for Disease Control and Protection, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/health-insurance.htm (last
visited November 2017).

32

Neil Vidmar, Juries and Medical Malpractice Claims: Empirical Facts
versus Myths. 467 Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research 367,
(2008).

33

Zenon Zabinski and Bernard S. Black, The Deterrent Effect of Tort Law:
Evidence from Medical Malpractice Reform. Nw. Law & Econ. Res.
Paper No. 13-09 (2015).
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of such bans has been recently called into question at a state level.34
Other reform proposals have included raising the standard of
proof to a higher and more convincing standard of proof.35 Raising
the standard may deter a small number of malpractice lawsuits that
are inherently trivial, but the decrease does not seem to be getting at
the root of the problem. Additionally, physicians have an incentive to
avoid litigation and instead settle. Although the reform may increase
the fraction of lawsuits that fail to meet the standard, it will not change
the physician’s incentive to settle even frivolous suits out of court.
It is becoming increasingly evident that tort reform at
the state or any level is relatively ineffective. State legislatures
should begin to look at potential replacements to the current tort
system despite its more extensive nature. Replacement is rational
for any state legislation attempting to make the malpractice
system more cost efficient and properly incentivize physicians.
III. Proposed Alternative to the Current
Malpractice Tort System
A. Analogous Alternatives to Litigation

Our proposed replacement of the current malpractice
tort system is not entirely unprecedented. Other fields of law
have similar features and help us understand why alternatives to
litigation can be in the best interest of opposing parties. In family
law, mediation in a number of states is often required before the
parties can proceed in the courts. For example, the state of Utah
requires that the parties attempt mediation before litigation can
commence.36 This structure is conscious of the costs associated with
legal processes; in fact, extensive and often unnecessary litigation
costs can be avoided if the parties come to voluntary agreements.
34

Jim Saunders, Malpractice Damage Caps struck down by Florida Supreme Court. Orlando Sentinel, 2017.

35

See supra Section I.

36

Utah Admin Code r. 30-3-39 (2008).
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Another example of an alternative is insurance company
review boards for insurance claims regarding issues like personal
injury. Rather than immediately suing an insurance company for
damages, the insurance company reviews the patient claim and
proposes a compensation package in the form of an arbitration
clause that satisfies the complainant and prevents further legal
action. This can be beneficial to both parties; the insurance company
is not required to engage in a legal battle rife with substantial
monetary losses and reputational risks, and the injured party
receives compensation much faster and does not share awards with
an attorney. Additionally, many state-funded profession boards,
such as the state bar, are authorized to hold hearings to determine
whether an attorney can practice law and other sanctions.37
B. Vermont’s Proposed Alternative

Similar to the methods in other areas of law, an alternative
approach to malpractice may prove more cost-efficient and reduce
defensive medicine practices while still requiring the high standard
of care that current medical malpractice law seeks to uphold. We
propose that the alternative should originate with the adoption of
an independent medical review board established by the state. As
previously mentioned, this proposal is not entirely unprecedented.
In 2013, the Vermont state legislature proposed a no-fault
compensation program for medical injury claims brought against
primary care physicians in Vermont. Their proposal attempted to
“streamline remedies for injured patients, free medical providers to
participate in health care rather than time-consuming lawsuits, and
dramatically scale back the time and expense of litigation.”38 They
further hypothesized that this system would cost the state less than
the current litigation system and more effectively provide timely
compensation to a greater number of patients.39 Additionally, they
37

Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 US 447 (1798).

38

H.B. 35, 2013 Leg., (Vt. 2013).

39

Id.
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claimed the proposal will “preserve the doctor’s role as the patient’s
advocate, as opposed to the litigation-based system in which the
doctor and patient become adversaries.”40 The review board would
be controlled by the state commissioner of financial regulation and
would consist of five members: (1) one primary care physician
licensed to practice in Vermont, (2) one attorney licensed to practice
in Vermont who has experience with medical malpractice, (3) one
person employed by a health insurer, and (4) two public members.41
The members of the board would have the authority to
review claims submitted by complainants requesting compensation
for medical injury at the hand of a primary care physician.42 They
would meet at least monthly to review petitions and grant awards at
their discretion.43 Interestingly, primary care physicians would pay an
annual fee into a fund to reimburse the review board’s expenses and pay
for successful claims, replacing malpractice insurance premiums.44
The “no-fault” part of the proposal essentially means that a particular
physician’s annual payment will not increase if an award is granted
from his negligence. Eliminating litigation and the need for malpractice
insurance combined with the “no-fault” annual fee should mitigate the
excessive fear being sued and make malpractice law more efficient.
Although the bill is intriguing, it has not yet gained enough
traction to be passed into law.45 This is likely the result of clear
demerits to the proposal. Mainly, the scope is limited to primary care
physicians. It does not reach far enough to totally replacement to the
current tort system. Only 5.2 percent of family-care physicians have

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Bill Status H.35, Vermont General Assembly, https://legislature.
vermont.gov/bill/status/2014/H.35 (last visited March 19, 2018).
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claims brought against them, the third lowest of all specialties.46
I argue that this alternative method must be applicable to all
practicing physicians to be sufficiently effective. This is because
most claims of malpractice are brought against specialty physicians
such as neurosurgeons or cardiovascular surgeons.47 Second, the
Vermont proposal fails to address how it will effectively punish
primary care physicians who are repeatedly, grossly, or willfully
negligent. Although such instances are rare, failure to include such
provisions are inexcusable and quite alarming given the potential
consequences. Two other concerns are conflicts of interest and the
appeals process. These issues make Vermont’s bill fragmented and
incomplete and make its denial justifiable. Despite its weakness and
ultimate failure, the proposal of an alternative malpractice system
should not go unnoticed. Given the right provisions, such a system
could survive and be more effective than the current structure.
C. Georgia’s Proposed Alternative

Also in 2013, members of the Georgia legislature proposed a
similar bill that sought to replace their malpractice tort system.48 The
alternative includes all physicians in the state of Georgia regardless of
specialty. Many of the numerous reasons cited for the proposal were
parallel to Vermont’s. These included pertinent issues like defensive
medicine, significant delays in compensation to injured patients, and
attorneys only taking “high-stakes” cases at the expense of the other
patients who have legitimate claims. The creators of the bill said the
proposal “intended to significantly reduce the practice of defensive
medicine, thereby reducing health care costs, increasing the number of
physicians practicing in this state, and providing patients fair and timely
46

47

48

Anupam B. Jena, Seth Seabury, Darius Lakdawalla and Amitabh Chandra. Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty. 365 N Eng J.
Med 629 (2011).
Anupam Jena, Seth Seabury, Darius Lakdawalla, Amitabh Chandra,
Malpractice Risk According to Physician Speciality, 365 N Eng. J. Med.
629, 629 (2011).

Patient Injury Act, S.B. 141, 152nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013).

A New Medical Malpractice Tort System

173

compensation without the expense and delay of the court system.”49
The bill creates the Patient Compensation System which
shall be governed by the Patient Compensation Board. The members
of the board shall serve four-year terms and shall elect a chair of the
board annually. This board would be composed of eleven members:
•

•

•

Five members shall be appointed by the governor:
o An actively practicing physician in the state,
o A business executive in the community,
o A hospital administrator,
o A certified public accountant who actively practices in the state,
o And an actively practicing attorney.
Three members shall be appointed by the lieutenant governor:
o A practicing physician in the state,
o A patient advocate,
o And one who does not need to meet any specific
criteria.
Three members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives subject to the same stipulations as
the Lieutenant Governor.50

This board, like the Vermont board, would oversee the review and
compensation of malpractice claims in the state of Georgia. If a
potential conflict of interest with a board member exists, the board
member must detail in writing this conflict of interest and recuse
himself or herself from the case. Similar to Vermont, compensation by
the Patient Compensation System shall be funded by the physicians
of the state. The amount would be determined on an annual basis by
the board. Another key provision included is an appellate process.
An administrative judge shall be appointed to review all appeals,
solely deciding whether the review board took the appropriate and
necessary steps to determine compensation for the patient. If the
49
50

Id., p. 4.
Id., p. 5.
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judge determines the board failed in its duty, the case is remanded
to the board for a second, more thorough review. If the review board
justly handled the claim, the judge confirms the original decision.51
Following an analysis of the two proposals, one can
see the Georgia proposal’s greater desirability in comparison to
Vermont’s bill. Many of the gaps in Vermont’s bill were addressed
and properly resolved. Disappointingly, this bill has not yet been
passed into law.52 Though improved, the proposal still failed
to address the major concern of punishing physicians who are
repeatedly, grossly, and/or willfully negligent. This must be a
part of any recommended replacement of malpractice tort law.
D. Our Proposed Alternative

To reiterate, we do not believe it damning that neither of these
bills has passed. Rather, they serve as stepping stones to passing a law
that replaces the current malpractice tort system. A sound proposal
must incorporate sound aspects from the previous proposals while
addressing physician accountability in a way that incentivizes a high
standard of care instead of defensive medicine. Georgia’s legislation
accomplished much of the legwork in establishing a comprehensive
and plausible alternative, lacking only a provision to hold physicians
accountable. For this reason, we would advocate adopting Georgia’s
approach and to simply add a system to hold physicians to the
appropriate standard of care. This can be accomplished by requiring
clinics and hospitals to publicize instances in which compensation
was awarded to injured patients for malpractice, including the name
of the involved physician. If requiring hospitals to do this proves
difficult, the state could utilize to the National Practitioner’s Data
Bank, which contains all lawsuits and adverse actions brought against

51
52

Id., p. 8-9.

SB 141 2013-2014 Regular Session, Georgia General Assembly,
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-US/display/20132014/
SB/141 (last visited March 19, 2018).
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a physician.53 Traditionally, this database is only available to hospitals,
federal and state health agencies, and other qualifying entities, but
its application here seems logical.54 The increased accountability
will hold doctors to a high standard without imposing an increased
fear of losing funds, thus lowering the prevalence of defensive
medicine. This requirement has already been proposed by the state
of New York.55 It effectually deters physicians from being careless
in their methods of practice and ensures they keep the patient’s best
interest at heart without incentivizing defensive medicine. careless
in their methods of practice and ensures they keep the patient’s
best interest at heart without incentivizing defensive medicine.
A “black mark” on a physician’s public record need not be
permanent. In fact, depending on the severity, this should not be the
case. If the black mark were perpetual, physicians may continue
to practice defensive medicine and our system would become
obsolete. Physicians should have the opportunity to take ethics
courses prescribed and provided by the medical review board. Upon
completion, the board may permit the omission of such marks.
Details should be determined by the established medical review
board, but theoretically, this simple addition should prove effective
in removing the incentive for defensive medicine. Like having a
driver’s license, practicing medicine is a privilege with consequences
for improper use. Physicians should be given the chance to clear
their record, granted no additional successful claims are brought
forward and the appropriate courses are taken and passed. In more
severe cases that privilege may not be granted; we would defer to
the greater judgment of the established medical review board to
make such distinctions. Also noteworthy is the fact that all criminal
charges regarding physicians should and will not be affected by this
proposal. The current system already makes this distinction, and
53
54

About Us, National Practitioner Data Bank, https://www.npdb.
hrsa.gov/topNavigation/aboutUs.jsp (last visited March 16, 2018).

55

A.B. 4764, 2013 Leg., (N.Y. 2013).

What is the NPDB?, National Practioner Data Bank, https://www.
npdb.hrsa.gov/resources/whatIsTheNPDB.jsp (Last visited March 16,
2018).
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after criminal acts, physicians are subject to criminal proceedings.
We are conscious that this replacement may or may not decrease
overall health care spending by the state, but it will make a more costefficient system that deters unnecessary spending on litigation and
defensive medicine. Furthermore, it will allow the focus to be centered
back to the patient, which is the original intent of the malpractice system.
IV. Conclusion
The billions spent annually on a broken tort system, the
prevalence of defensive medicine, and failed attempts at reforming
the system all make a replacement of the current malpractice tort
system necessary. Patients are suffering medically and financially at
the hand of a system failing to live up to its aspirations of patientfirst care. Health care insurance premiums continue to rise due to
increased health care costs, partially fueled by the increase of
defensive medicine and the increasing cost of liability insurance.
More important, patients rarely benefit from defensive medicine and
even face severe negative consequences from such practices. Yet, it is
hard to blame clinicians for practicing defensive medicine when they
are involved in the current malpractice system. It would be unrealistic
to expect a physician who fears a lawsuit and a severe increase in
malpractice premiums to refrain from practicing defensive medicine.
We are certainly not the first to see such concerns in the
health care environment as legislation from many states have
attempted reform. As outlined in this paper, these attempts do not
resolve the core issue found within the tort system itself. As long as
medical lawsuits are prominent, malpractice insurance and defensive
medicine will continue to rise at the expense of the physician and,
consequently, the patient. The best resolution is a replacement of the
current system. This undertaking may seem daunting, but examining
the successes and failures of previous replacement attempts makes
this task feasible. Using the proposed legislation in states such as
Vermont, New York, and Georgia, we have proposed a novel—yet
practical—solution that maintains the accepted standard of care
without incentivizing physicians to practice defensive medicine.
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We admit that our resolutions constitute only a basic framework for
such a replacement, and we defer the details of implementation to the
expertise of state officials. Therefore, we call upon legislatures from
each state to assess the malpractice climate within their own region and
implement a replacement using the framework outlined in our paper.

